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Abstract
Firms frequently o¤er refunds, both when physical products are returned and
when service contracts are terminated prematurely. We show how refunds act as a
"metering device" when consumers learn about their personal valuation while experi-
menting with the product or service. Our theory predicts that low-quality rms o¤er
ine¢ ciently strict terms for refunds, while high-quality rms o¤er ine¢ ciently gen-
erous terms. This may help to explain the observed variety in contractual terms. As
in our model strict cancellation terms and low refunds are used to price discriminate,
rather than to trap consumers into purchasing inferior products, the imposition of a
statutory minimum refund policy would not, in general, improve consumer surplus
or welfare.
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1 Introduction
The annual turnover of product return in the U.S. retail industry exceeds 100 Billion U.S.
Dollars, of which 70% are due to reasons of taste and t1 (see Posselt et al. 2008 and
Anderson et al. 2009). Likewise, contracts for services, including insurances, utilities, or
subscriptions to health clubs, frequently involve cancellation clauses allowing customers
to terminate prematurely. Refunds and termination clauses are thus ubiquitous. As we
document below, however, there is wide variety in the use that rms make of such contracts.
Our paper presents a simple theory of refunds that generates such heterogeneity. We
present a model where rms price discriminate between consumers by using refunds as
a device for "metering" (cf. Schmalensee 1981). In our model, high-quality rms o¤er
excessively generous terms, while low-quality rms o¤er excessively strict terms.
Several studies nd that higher-quality retailers, such as up-market stores or internet
retailers with a higher customer rating, o¤er more generous terms (e.g., Heiman et al. 2002;
Bonield et al. 2010). When rm characteristics and product quality are unobservable to
customers at the time of purchase, this relationship could be explained through signaling,
similar to the theory of warranties put forward by Grossman (1981).2 However, when
the reported measures of quality, such as customer ratings, are readily observable by
customers, signaling alone cannot explain the observed heterogeneity. In our model, high-
quality rms extract more surplus from consumers by o¤ering an excessively high refund,
while the opposite holds for competing low-quality rms. These distortions "at both ends"
also distinguish our theory frommodels that explain contract heterogeneity by an e¢ ciency
rationale, e.g., as goods di¤er in their salvage value to rms after they are returned.3
Our setting borrows heavily from the literature on "sequential screening" (Courty and
Li 2000).4 Consumers hold only privately observed prior beliefs about their valuation
and learn from experimenting with the product or service. In our baseline model of a
monopolistic seller, the departure from the set-up in Courty and Li (2000) is that we do
not allow for a menu of contracts, as we restrict the rm to o¤er a single contract. Such a
restriction may be particularly realistic with physical products. Otherwise, a rm would
have to ascertain that a customer who bought under a less generous refund policy does not
1Such returns are also classied as "returns of not damaged goods".
2Cf. also theories of moral hazard such as Mann and Wissink (1990).
3Davis et al. (1995) document a positive correlation between the salvage value and the refund.
4Matthews and Persico (2007) allow, in addition, for the acquisition of information before purchasing.
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claim a higher refund by returning a product that was bought by another customer under a
more generous refund policy. That is, the rm must ensure that product-customer matches
remain uniquely identied as, otherwise, a "grey market" for second-hand products could
allow returning customers to always use the most generous refund policy available. While
it is common in retailing to make product return contingent on holding a valid receipt,
such a "plain receipt policy" would not be su¢ cient for this purpose. Letting customers
choose between di¤erent contracts, specifying di¤erent prices and refunds, may also be
unprotable when it consumes too much valuable assistance time at the point of sale.
Finally, customers may shy away from the additional complexity that this decision involves.
These arguments suggest that sometimes it may be realistic to restrict consideration to a
single contract policy, instead of a menu. This generates a role for refunds and cancellation
terms as a "metering device".
In our model of competition, two rms with a known high or low quality are in the
market. Following the approach in Shaked and Sutton (1982), consumers who ultimately
derive a higher utility from the product have also a higher marginal valuation for high
quality. Prior to experimenting with a product or service, consumers have only imprecise
knowledge of their utility (their "true type"). We characterize an equilibrium where the
market is segmented as follows. Customers who, ex-ante, have a lower expected utility turn
to the low-quality rm, and customers who, ex-ante, have a higher expected utility turn to
the high-quality rm. Consequently, for the low-quality rm its "marginal" customer has
the highest ex-ante valuation among all its customers and, therefore, the lowest marginal
valuation for a higher refund, given that he is less likely to return the product (or to
terminate a contract prematurely). By reducing the refund below the e¢ cient level, which
is equal to the salvage value or to the cost of continuing service, the low-quality rm can
extract more of the consumer surplus of "inframarginal" customers, who have low ex-ante
valuation.
For the high-quality rm the opposite picture emerges. There, the "marginal" customer
has the lowest ex-ante valuation and, therefore, the highest marginal valuation for a higher
refund. To extract relatively more consumer surplus from its "inframarginal" customers,
who have a higher ex-ante valuation, the high-quality rm optimally o¤ers a refund that
is excessively generous.
As noted above, the setting borrows heavily from Courty and Li (2000). There, a
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monopolistic seller o¤ers an optimal menu, which prescribes an e¢ cient refund for the
highest-value customer and a higher refund for all other customer types. A high refund
is also the outcome in Che (1996), where customers are risk averse. As we noted above,
theories of signaling would predict an ine¢ ciently high refund for a rm with an unob-
servable high quality, while the refund policy of the low-quality rm would be e¢ cient.
The novelty of our model is thus to generate a large heterogeneity in contractual terms
as low-quality rms o¤er ine¢ ciently low refunds and high-quality rms o¤er ine¢ ciently
high refunds.
Several contributions (cf. Loewenstein et al. 2003 or Inderst and Ottaviani 2009)
have shown that when consumers are naive with respect to sellers incentives or their
own future valuation (projection bias), the imposition of a statutory minimum right of
product return may be benecial as it protects consumers. In our model, the low-quality
rm o¤ers an ine¢ ciently low refund or, likewise, ine¢ ciently strict cancellation terms in
order to better practice price discrimination. As is well known, restricting such a practice
has, in general, ambiguous e¤ects on welfare and expected consumer surplus (cf. also the
discussion in Section 6). It is also important that according to our model, consumers
who purchase under such a strict refund policy are not unknowingly trapped, but they
purchase the respective product or service under perfect information about its quality,
though they are still uncertain about their personal valuation. From this perspective, our
model thus also provides a warning to consumer protection policy: A negative correlation
between cancellation terms and product quality is not necessarily a sign that consumers are
systematically fooled by some rms. Instead, it may be the outcome of price discrimination,
in which case the impact of policy intervention should, in general, be ambiguous.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model.
In Sections 3 and 4 we derive the results under monopoly and competition, respectively.
Section 5 extends the model to the case where consumers vary in the quality of information
they possess ex-ante. Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Utility. We model a market for di¤erentiated goods. For a given consumer in this
market, utility depends both on a common quality measure y that di¤ers between rms
3
and an intrinsic t t that di¤ers between consumers:
u(t; y) = yt:
Importantly, we postulate that t, which is not observed by the rms, is also only partially
observed by consumers before they purchase. Specically, we stipulate that
t =  + s; (1)
where  is observed before purchase and s only after purchase. Here,  2 [; ] 2  is
distributed according to G() with density g() > 0, while s 2 [s; s] = S is distributed
according to F (s) with density f(s) > 0. For clarity of exposition we assume that these
are drawn independently, both for a given consumer and across consumers. In Section 5
we generalize this assumption.5 There is a mass one of consumers in the market.
Firms and Contracts. At most two rms operate in the market, which we denote by
i = l; h. Firm hs intrinsic quality is given by yh > 0 and rm ls is given by yl where
0 < yl < yh. That is, rm hs intrinsic quality is better than that of rm l.
Firms have constant production costs c > 0 and o¤er the following contracts. A
contract species a sales price p together with a refund q. When a good is returned, it
has the salvage value k with 0 < k < c. Note that the salvage value is independent of the
rms "quality" y. For instance, we may suppose that after early return the good is no
longer suitable for its primary usage. Further, the salvage values independence of quality
allows us to focus on the metering e¤ects.
As noted in the Introduction, our model applies to service contracts. Then, c k is the
cost of initiating a contract, while k is the cost of continuing to service a customer who
has not terminated earlier. Likewise, p  q is the price for initiating the contract and q is
the extra pay for continuing the service.
Firms o¤er a single contract (p; q). As we discussed in the Introduction, a menu may
not be feasible when a returned product cannot be matched surely to a particular purchase
contract, so that there is scope for "arbitrage" between returning and non-returning cus-
tomers. Also, administering di¤erent contracts, instead of a single contract, may be too
costly at the point of sale, while also customers may prefer a simple, transparent choice.
5It should be noted that the additive structure of t is by itself not restrictive. In fact, the part of t
that is unknown to a consumer ex-ante (the "error term") can always be dened as s = t  .
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Timing. We consider the following market game. At  = 0, each rm chooses a contract
(p; q). At  = 1, each consumer learns his ex-ante "type"  and chooses whether to
purchase and, if so, from which rm. At  = 2, provided a consumer purchased, he learns
the full t t = + s and thus the respective utility u(t; y). He can then choose whether to
return the product, in which case he realizes the refund q. Otherwise, he keeps the good
and realizes the utility u(t; y) in  = 3. All parties are risk neutral, and we abstract from
discounting. Note that, according to this specication, the customer only derives utility
when consuming the service over the time interval between  = 2 and  = 3, but not
over the "experimentation" phase between  = 1 and  = 2. Our qualitative results all
hold, however, when a fraction of u(t; y) is enjoyed over the rst interval and the residual
fraction over the second interval.
Finally, we make the following parameter restrictions that ensure that we can safely
rule out some corner solutions. From
yh( + s) < k; (2)
returning the product with positive probability is e¢ cient also for the highest ex-ante
customer type. From
yl( + s) > c; (3)
purchasing and consuming the product is e¢ cient for the lowest ex-ante type, at least for
the highest realization s.
3 Monopoly Benchmark
Suppose for now that only a single rm is in the market. Since only a single rm operates,
presently we drop the subscript i 2 fl; hg for clarity.
A customer returns a product when y( + s) < q, while he continues to consume the
good when y( + s)  q.6 His expected utility from purchasing is given by
U(q; p; ) := V (q; )  p; (4)
6As this is a zero-probability event, we stipulate without loss of generality that the consumer does not
return the product when he is indi¤erent.
5
where7
V (q; ) =
Z
S
max[y ( + s) ; q]dF (s)
= qF (q=y   ) +
Z s
q=y 
y ( + s) dF (s).
Note further that dV=d  0, which holds strictly whenever the good is consumed with
positive probability. Note also that the consumers decision to ask for a refund is interim
e¢ cient only when s < sFB, where
y( + sFB) = k:
(For ease of exposition we suppress the dependency of sFB on the parameters, in particular
on the type .) When q > k holds, the refund is too generous, and the product will be
returned too frequently. Instead, when q < k holds, the refund is ine¢ ciently low, and the
product will be consumed too frequently.
The rms expected prot with a consumer of type  consists of two parts: The up-front
margin, p  c, and the additional prot or loss when the product is returned:
(p; q; ) := p  c+ (k   q)F (q=y   ). (5)
We have
d(p; q; )
d
=  (k   q)f(q=y   ) T 0, q T k.
Thus, when the refund is set e¢ ciently with q = k, the rm realizes the same expected
prots with all customers. Instead, since the return probability declines with the ex-ante
type , for q > k the rm would prefer to contract with consumers who initially have a
higher expected value for the good (high ). Likewise, when the refund is ine¢ ciently low,
as q < k, the rm would prefer to contract with low- consumers. It is nally useful to
dene the total surplus with a type- customer:
!(q; ) =
Z s
q=y 
[y ( + s)  k] dF (s) + k   c:
7Note that when y(q  ) < s or y(q  ) > s, we can evaluate F simply by extending the boundary of
the support beyond S.
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Optimal Refund. Recall that V (q; ) is increasing in . Consequently, as long as there
is a sale with positive probability, at  = 1 there is a critical type  2 [; ) so that all
consumers    purchase, while consumers  <  do not purchase.8 From inspection of
(4) we can immediately conclude that  increases with p and decreases with q. Hence,
the rm chooses (p; q) so as to maximize expected prots
(p; q; ) =
Z 

(p; q; )dG() (6)
subject to the participation constraint of the lowest type: U(q; p; ) = 0.9
Proposition 1 Suppose there is a single rm in the market. The monopolist chooses a
refund that is ine¢ ciently generous, q > k.
Proof. For the proof we can take some  as given, which for a given q pins down p from
the requirement that U(q; p; ) = 0. After substitution we have
(q; p; ) =
Z 

[V (q; )  c+ (k   q)F (q=y   )] dG(): (7)
We now di¤erentiate with respect to q to obtain the rst-order condition
d(q; p; )
dq
= 0;
which yieldsZ 

[F (q=y   )  F (q=y   )] dG()  (q   k)1
y
Z 

f(q=y   )dG() = 0: (8)
The rst term in (8) is strictly positive whenever at least the lowest participating type
 returns with positive probability,
q=y    > s; (9)
and when at least the highest participating type does not return with positive probability,
q=y    < s: (10)
8Again, resolving the indi¤erence of the ex-ante type  in this way is without loss of generality, as the
realization  =  is a zero-probability event.
9Strictly speaking, when  =  holds, this already uses that, by optimality for the rm, the price p is
set so as to make  just indi¤erent between purchasing and not purchasing.
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In this case, i.e., when (9) and (10) hold, we have immediately that q   k > 0.
In what follows, we show that (9) and (10) must hold. Take rst (10). If this did not
hold, prots would be negative from k < c. Take next (9). We argue to the contrary and
suppose that there are no returns in equilibrium. Note that this requires that q < k (cf.
condition (2)). The rm then makes prots of (p   c)[1   G()]. Prots clearly remain
unchanged as we increase q until q=y    = s holds with equality. As we then increase
q < k further, however, we have from inspection of (8) that d(p; q; )=dq > 0, which
contradicts the optimality of the initial choice q. Thus, also (9) must hold at an optimal
value q. Q.E.D.
This result is best understood in terms of "metering". Recall that high- consumers
 >  receive a strictly positive consumer rent: U(p; q; ) > 0. Recall also that consumers
with a higher ex-ante type  are less likely to make use of the refund option. In fact, the
type that is most likely to return the product is the marginal type . When the rm
increases the refund q and the price p simultaneously, so as to keep the marginal consumer
just indi¤erent, this makes U(p; q; ), as a function of the type , atter. It allows to extract
more consumer surplus from higher types, though at the cost of ine¢ ciently reducing
available surplus with all consumer types.
This trade-o¤ between rent extraction for high- consumers and maximization of total
surplus is most evident when we rewrite the rst-order condition for q (cf. (8)) as follows:
(q   k)1
y
Z 

f(q=y   )dG() =
Z 

[F (q=y   )  F (q=y   )] dG(): (11)
There, the rent-extraction rationale is captured by the term on the right-hand side and
the rationale to maximize ex-ante surplus by the term on the left-hand side.
Incidentally, note that as consumers make di¤erent use of the refund option, the cost
that this imposes on the seller, given that q   k > 0, is also type-dependent. This is
di¤erent, for instance, in the seminal contribution by Spence (1975), where a change
in quality may a¤ect the valuation of the marginal consumer di¤erently from that of
"inframarginal" consumers, but where the cost of servicing a customer is the same.
Comparative Statics. To conduct a comparative analysis, we stipulate for brevitys
sake that the sellers problem is strictly quasiconcave. Further, we invoke the standard
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hazard rate assumption that for G()
d
d

g()
1 G()

> 0: (12)
The following Corollary then provides the intuitive result that the "metering distortion"
decreases, so that the refund becomes closer to the e¢ cient (salvage) value, as the di¤erence
between the "marginal" type  and the "inframarginal" types  >  decreases.
Corollary 1 When (12) holds, the monopolists optimal choice of q > k becomes less
distorted (lower q and thus lower di¤erence q   k > 0) when his coverage of the market
decreases (higher ).
Proof. Note rst that as  ! , we have from rewriting the rst-order condition (11)
q   k = y
R 
 [F (q
=y   )  F (q=y   )] dG()R 
 f(q
=y   )dG()
and by applying lHopitals rule that q   k converges to
y
[1 G()]
g()

=
= 0.
Next, from implicit di¤erentiation of (8), together with the stipulated strict quasicon-
cavity of the sellers program, we have that the sign of the continuous function dq=d is
determined by the expression
d2
dqd
= f(q=y   ) [1 G()]

(q   k)1
y
g()
1 G()   1

: (13)
To sign (13), note rst that q > k holds whenever  <  (cf. Proposition 1) and that
q ! k as  ! , which implies that dq=d must be decreasing somewhere. Arguing to
a contraction, suppose thus that dq=d > 0 were to hold for some values . Then, by
continuity of dq=d, there must be some value(s)  <  where the term (13) is zero and
where, in addition, it cuts zero from above. To see that this cannot be the case, note that
the derivative of (13), when evaluated at such a point , equals:
d (f(q=y   ) [1 G()])
d

(q   k)1
y
g()
1 G()   1

+f(q=y   ) [1 G()]

dq
d
1
y
g()
1 G() + (q
   k)1
y
d
d

g()
1 G()

= f(q=y   ) [1 G()] (q   k)1
y
d
d

g()
1 G()

> 0:
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Here, the equality follows as at the considered value , both dq=d = 0 and
h
(q   k) 1
y
g()
1 G()   1
i
=
0. The inequality, in turn, follows from q > k and from the hazard rate assumption (12).
Thus, the term (13) is indeed strictly positive in the immediate right-side neighborhood
of the considered value , and we obtain a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Equilibrium Market Coverage. How is the marginal ex-ante type  pinned down?
To keep our exposition brief, suppose that the rms program to choose q is strictly quasi-
concave for a given , so that there is always a unique value q that solves the respective
rst-order condition (8). Then, di¤erentiating the rms prots in (7) and making use of
the envelope theorem with respect to q, we have that
d(q; p; )
d
= y
Z 

[1  F (q=y   )] dG()  g() [U(q; p; ) + (q; p; )] : (14)
Observe that the last term in (14) captures the total surplus that is realized with the
marginal type . When  is interior, then the rst-order condition implies that this must
be strictly positive. In this case, we have
!(q; ) = U(q; p; ) + (q; p; ) =
1 G()
g()
y [1  F (q=y   )] :
In standard terminology, in this case the virtual surplus of  is zero, but the true surplus
is strictly positive. Note nally that the optimal price p is then, for given  and q,
derived immediately from the requirement that
p = V (q; )
= qF (q=y   ) +
Z s
q=y 
y ( + s) dF (s):
4 Competition
Initially, we proceed under the joint assumption that, rst, both rms have a positive share
of the market and that, second, there is full market coverage. When both rms are active
and when customers do not randomize between where to purchase, we can segment the
type space  into two subsets: All types  2 l purchase at rm l and all types  2 h
purchase at rm h, where full market coverage implies l [h = . Denote now the two
pairs of contracts by the respective subscripts l and h, i.e., by writing (ql; pl) and (qh; ph).
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We further abbreviate the respective expected utility for a customer of type  by writing
Ul() and Uh(). The prots of each rm are given by10
i =
Z
2i
(pi; qi; )dG():
From consumer optimality, it must hold that Uh()  Ul() for all  2 h and Ul() 
Uh() for all  2 l. Note that the o¤er made by the other rm j generates for each
consumer who purchases at rm i 6= j a type-dependent reservation value. As is standard
in the theory of contracting with ex-ante private information, we now apply the following
procedure. We rst solve a relaxed program for each rm, where we assume that the
"participation constraint", i.e., that Uh()  Ul() or, respectively, Ul()  Uh(), binds
only at a single customer type: There is a critical type  <  < , so that from Ul(
) =
Uh(
), together with Uh() > Ul() for all  > 
 and Uh() < Ul() for all  < 
, the
participation constraint binds only at .
Optimal Refund. When the relaxed program applies, the contract design problems
for the two rms simplify as follows. As in our preceding analysis with a monopoly, we
rst take  as given, now together with the respective reservation value U  0, so that
Ul(
) = Uh(
) = U. For the two rms, the respective prot functions from the two
relaxed programs are then given by
h = h(ph; qh; 
) =
Z 

(ph; qh; )dG();
l = l(pl; ql; 
) =
Z 

(pl; ql; )dG():
After substitution for the respective prices pl and ph from the participation constraints, in
analogy to the procedure in the proof of Proposition 1, this yields
h =
Z 

[V (qh; yh; 
)  c  (qh   k)F (qh=yh   )  U] dG();
l =
Z 

[V (ql; yl; 
)  c  (ql   k)F (ql=yl   )  U] dG():
Note that, to avoid confusion, we have made explicit the dependency of V () on the quality
of the consumed product, yl or yh.
10This presumes that both sets of types are measurable.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that with competition the market is fully covered and that it is
su¢ cient to consider, for each rm, only the participation constraint of some marginal
type  that segments the market. Then, the high-quality rm h chooses a refund that
is ine¢ ciently generous, qh > k, while the low-quality rm l chooses a refund that is
ine¢ ciently strict, ql < k.
Proof. When the refund for either rm is characterized by the respective rst-order
condition, we have in analogy to the proof of Proposition 1 (cf. condition (8)) that
(qh   k) 1
yh
Z 

f(qh=yh   )dG() =
Z 

[F (qh=yh   )  F (qh=yh   )] dG() (15)
and
(ql   k) 1
yl
Z 

f(ql=yl   )dG() =
Z 

[F (ql=yl   )  F (ql=yl   )] dG(): (16)
When these rst-order conditions apply, the assertions that qh > k and q

l < k follow
immediately. Finally, by the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can rule
out for either rm the cases where the good is either returned with probability one or
never returned with probability one. Q.E.D.
The intuition for the competitive result under market segmentation is immediate from
our previous discussion of how a monopolistic rm can use the refund for metering, thereby
extracting a higher surplus from "inframarginal" consumer types. For the low-quality rm,
the marginal type  is now, however, the highest type that it serves. Under the assumption
that the relaxed program applies for both rms, we have for all lower types  <  that
Ul() > Uh(): Their utility from purchasing the low-quality product is strictly higher
than their respective (type-dependent) reservation value, which they would realize when
purchasing, instead, the high-quality product. To extract more of the low typesconsumer
surplus, the low-quality rm nds it optimal to reduce the refund below the e¢ cient level.
By reducing ql and adjusting the price pl accordingly, Ul() becomes steeper, which reduces
the expected utility for all lower types. Recall, instead, that for the (high-quality) rm,
which serves the upper segment of the market, it is optimal to make Uh() atter, which
is achieved by setting qh > k.
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Market Segmentation. To complete the characterization, we have from Uh() =
Ul(
) that ph = V (q

h; yh; 
)   Ul() and pl = V (ql ; yl; )   Uh(). Further, to de-
termine the marginal type , we obtain from di¤erentiation of the two prot functions,
similar to the procedure in the monopoly case, that
!h(
) = !h(qh; p

h; yh; q

l ; p

l yl; 
) (17)
= V (qh:yh; 
)  ph + (qh; ph; )
=
1 G()
g()

dUh(
)
d
  dUl(
)
d

=
1 G()
g()
[yh [1  F (qh=yh   )]  yl [1  F (ql =yl   )]]
and, likewise, that
!l (
) = !l(qh; p

h; yh; q

l ; p

l yl; 
) (18)
=
G()
g()
[yh [1  F (qh=yh   )]  yl [1  F (ql =yl   )]] :
Note that
dUh(
)
d
>
dUl(
)
d
(19)
is necessary to ensure that the participation constraint for each rm is indeed slack around
the marginal type. Generally, for yh > yl, we have from
dUi()
d
= yi [1  F (qi =yi   )] (20)
that a su¢ cient condition for the assumed segmentation is given by
qh
yh
 q

l
yl
: (21)
Though condition (21) is not in terms of the primitives alone, it is easily checked when
results can be explicitly computed. For instance, when F (s) is uniformly distributed with
support [0; s] and G() is uniformly distributed with support [; ], we obtain
qh = k +
1
2
yh
 
   
and
ql = k  
1
2
yl (
   ) :
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After substituting also for the optimal , condition (21) becomes
1
2
 
    < k 1
yl
  1
yh

: (22)
Note also that condition (21), respectively condition (22), is only a su¢ cient, but not a
necessary condition.
When there is no such segmentation, each rm possibly serves a set of disjunct intervals.
A simple characterization is then no longer obtained. However, our key observation on
how refunds change in quality across rms would then still be preserved.
Proposition 3 Under full coverage, when both rms are active in the market and when
yh > yl, then ql < q

h.
Proof. See Appendix.
Comparative Statics. We now consider the partition of the market, as given by ,
as exogenous and conduct a comparative analysis. As in the monopoly case, this helps to
bring out the mechanism driving the metering distortion. For brevitys sake, we stipulate
again that the rmsproblems are strictly quasiconcave. We continue to maintain the
hazard rate condition (12) while adding its standard complementary condition, namely,
that for G()
d
d

g()
G()

< 0: (23)
With this we can extend the previous monotonicity result from the monopoly case,
albeit now the distortions in the two rmscontracts change inversely: While one contract
becomes more distorted, the other contract becomes less distorted.
Corollary 2 When (12) and (23) hold, both qh > k and q

l < k decrease as 
 increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
Equilibrium Market Partition. Finally, we turn to the question how the marginal
type  is pinned down with competition. From the rst-order conditions for the two
rms, with respect to , we have
ph = c  (k   qh)F (qh=yh   ) +
1 G()
g()

dUh(
)
d
  dUl(
)
d

(24)
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and
pl = c  (k   ql )F (ql =yl   ) +
G()
g()

dUh(
)
d
  dUl(
)
d

; (25)
where we can use dUi(
)=d from (20). When both rms have a positive market share,
these conditions must hold together with the indi¤erence condition
V (qh; yh; 
)  ph = V (ql ; yl; )  pl :
To further pin down market shares, we would have to make specic functional choices.
5 Heterogeneity in the Value of Information
In the following Section, we extend the analysis to the case where, ex-ante, consumers do
not di¤er in their expected valuation, but rather in the expected value from experimenting
with the product, i.e., in the quality of information that they expect to thereby obtain (cf.
Courty and Li 2000). We thus postulate that t, the t value, is now given by
t = s: (26)
Also, it holds that
R
S
sdF (s) = 0 and for all types    > 0. Thus,  orders the conditional
distribution of t in the sense of a Mean-Preserving Spread.
To rule out corner solutions, we assume in analogy to the parameter restriction (3)
that yls > c. Note that from s < 0, the restriction corresponding to (2), namely that
yhs < k, is now always satised, given  > 0.
A consumer returns rm is product whenever yis < qi, while keeping it otherwise.
His gross expected utility is thus given by
V (qi; yi; ) =
Z
S
max[yis; qi]dF (s) (27)
= qiF (qi= (yi)) +
Z s
qi=(yi)
yisdF (s):
This is strictly increasing in the quality, yi, provided that the product is not always re-
turned. Expected utility is also increasing in the customers type
dV (qi; yi; )
d
=
Z s
qi=(yi)
yisdF (s)  0;
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which holds strictly when the product is not returned for sure. From this we have also
that
d2V (qi; yi; )
ddqi
=  f(qi= (yi))1

 0;
which holds strictly when the threshold qi= (yi) is in the interior of the support of s. Thus,
as long as a customer both returns and consumes the product with positive probability,
the marginal valuation for a higher refund is strictly decreasing in .
For generality, we also want to account for the case where the t value turns out to
be negative. To avoid "forcing" the buyer to then consume the product, we stipulate that
there is free disposal. Note that, in principle, this also imposes a restriction on the lowest
feasible refund, q  0. However, this restriction will not bind in equilibrium.
Similar to the procedure above, we rst assume again that the respective participation
constraints Ui()  Uj() with i 6= j bind only at some interior type  <  < , so that
we can focus on the thereby relaxed program. A rms prot with consumer  is now given
by
(pi; qi; ) = pi   c+ (k   qi)F (qi= (yi)) :
In analogy to Proposition 1, substitution for the respective prices pl and ph yields expected
rm prots
h =
Z 

[V (qh; yh; 
)  c  (qh   k)F (qh= (yh))  U] dG();
l =
Z 

[V (ql; yl; 
)  c  (ql   k)F (ql= (yl))  U] dG();
where U is the utility that is obtained by the marginal type.
Proposition 4 Take now the utility function u = ty, with type t = s (cf. (26)). Sup-
pose the market is fully covered and that it is su¢ cient to consider only the participation
constraint of some marginal type  that segments the market. Then, as in Proposition 2,
rm h sets an ine¢ ciently generous refund, qh > k, and rm l sets an ine¢ ciently strict
refund, ql < k.
Proof. When the refund for either rm is characterized by the respective rst-order
condition, we have in analogy to the proof of Proposition 2 (respectively, Proposition 1;
cf. condition (8)) that
(qh   k) 1
yh
Z 

1

f(qh= (yh))dG() =
Z 

[F (qh= (
yh))  F (qh= (yh))] dG() (28)
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and
(ql   k) 1
yl
Z 

1

f(ql= (yl))dG() =
Z 

[F (ql= (
yl))  F (ql= (yl))] dG(): (29)
When these hold, the assertions that qh > k and q

l < k follow immediately from the fact
that the probability of return decreases with the consumers type, as noted above. Note
also that ql > 0.
Finally, by the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can rule out
for either rm the cases where the good is either returned with probability one or never
returned with probability one (i.e., the cases where ql and qn would be determined by the
respective corner solutions, rather than the respective rst-order conditions). Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 mirrors the characterization from Proposition 2. We have thus estab-
lished another channel through which customer heterogeneity together with vertical di¤er-
entiation of products can lead to a wide variety of refund policies, in line with the empirical
observations (cf. the Introduction). Note nally that, as previously, we have focused on
the case where the market is segmented in two type sets. Again, condition (19) is necessary
for this to hold, which now transforms to
dUh(
)
d
  dUl(
)
d
=
Z ql =(yl)
qh=(yh
)
yhsdF (s) +
Z s
ql =(yl
)
(yh   yl) sdF (s)
and which holds for any  whenever qh=yh  ql =yl (cf. condition (21)). Again, while
this is not in terms of the models primitives, it can be readily veried once a solution has
been calculated. For instance, when both  and s are distributed uniformly, in analogy to
condition (22), we obtain the condition
yl

2  1

   


 yh

2  1

   


,
where  = ln
 

  ln ().
General Signal Structure. So far we considered two di¤erent ways to model the in-
teraction of customer types and information. In the rst case, we could use immediately
from the specication t = +s that the type  orders the distribution of "t values" in the
sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance. This implied, in turn, that for higher types
 it was less likely that they return the product or cancel a contract prematurely. Recall
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that this feature was essential to derive the "metering result", which then lead to the two
distortions in the refund o¤ered by low-quality and high-quality rms.
Clearly, in the second case, where t = s, the type  no longer implies such a general
ordering of the distribution of "t values". In fact, now  orders the distributions in the
sense of a Mean-Preserving Spread. However, given that, in equilibrium, the refund is
(strictly) positive, qi > 0, we still have that dPr(t < qi=yij)=d < 0. In fact, our results
thereby apply whenever the conditional distribution of Pr(tj) exhibits this property over
the relevant range.
Finally, it should be noted that the obtained results as well as the simple characteriza-
tion are also more general in the following way. Recently, Esö and Szentes (2007) use an
orthogonalizing procedure to separate between the "old information", already contained
in , and the "new information" that is provided by s, and which we may term z. Then,
 and z are, by construction, independently distributed. They then consider joint distri-
butions where (i) E(tj; s) increases with s and where (ii) dPr(tj)=d < 0, showing that
there always exists an equivalent representation of the "t value", as a direct function of
 and z, that still satises (ii). As noted above, for our results we only need this ordering
for all values where the product is certainly not "disposed o¤", t  0.
6 Concluding Remarks
Firms frequently o¤er refunds, both when physical products are returned and when service
contracts are terminated prematurely. This paper shows how refunds can be used by rms
as a "metering device" in case consumers, while having di¤erent expectations about their
utility, still learn when experimenting with the product or service. In our benchmark
monopoly case, which borrows from Courty and Li (2000), the refund is ine¢ ciently high,
as this allows the rm to extract more of the consumer rent of consumers with a high
ex-ante valuation and thus a lower marginal valuation for the refund. As we argued above,
the case where rms are restricted to o¤er a single refund policy for all consumers, so that
they cannot achieve perfect sorting through a menu, seems reasonable in many instances,
as matching consumers to particular contracts may be time-consuming at the point-of-
sale and, in addition, may require additional after-sales monitoring to prevent consumer
arbitrage.
Our main contribution lies in the analysis of the competitive model. There, two verti-
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cally di¤erentiated rms, as in Shaked and Sutton (1982), compete through o¤ering prices
and refund terms. Our main positive prediction is that the low-quality rm o¤ers a lower
refund, though the salvage value is the same across products and even though product
quality is observable to consumers ("no signaling"). We showed that this result is robust
to a di¤erent source of consumer heterogeneity, where consumers di¤er in the precision of
information that they obtain from experimenting with the product or service. Our results
may thus o¤er an explanation for the wide variety of contractual terms that have been
observed in empirical work (cf. the Introduction).
From a normative perspective, refunds are ine¢ cient at both rms. In particular, the
low-quality rm o¤ers an ine¢ ciently strict refund policy. In non-reported calculations we
have explored the impact of stipulating a binding, mandatory minimum refund, similar to
a consumer protection policy. This restricts the low-quality rms scope for price discrim-
ination. The impact that this has on welfare and expected consumer surplus is generally
ambiguous. This observation is in line with the standard notion that restricting price
discrimination has ambiguous e¤ects. In terms of consumer protection, this suggests that
imposing a minimum mandatory refund or minimum cancellation terms could backre by
reducing, instead of increasing, consumer surplus and welfare, provided that strict terms
of refund are used as a means to price discriminate, as in our model.
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7 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. We argue to a contradiction. Suppose that in equilibrium
ql  qh. Given yh > yl, condition (21) holds and the market is separated with rm h
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operating on [; ] and rm l on [; ). Fix a cuto¤ point . When both rms are
active in the market,  is interior. We need to analyze three cases: (i) ql  qh  k, (ii)
k  ql  qh, (iii) ql  k  qh.
Take rst case (i). From inspection of dl(
)=dql, using the rst-order condition in
(16), note rst that independent of ql, it holds for ql  0 thatZ 

[F (ql=yl   )  F (ql=yl   )] dG()  0:
Thus, since f(s) > 0, dl(
)=dql is strictly negative for all ql 2 (k; ql ]. This implies that
neither ql  qh > k nor ql > qh  k can hold in equilibrium for rm l. Still staying with
case (i), suppose next that ql = q

h = k. Since yh
 
 + s

< k < yl ( + s), cf. (2) and (3),
it must hold that Z 

[F (ql=yl   )  F (ql=yl   )] dG() < 0
and hence dl(
)ndqljql=k < 0, so that with ql = qh = k rm l would still want to deviate.
The argument proving that k  ql  qh (case (ii)) cannot arise in equilibrium is
analogous, with the only di¤erence that this time one must consider rm hs unilateral
deviation. Finally, with regards to case (iii), observe that we have already ruled out that
ql = q

h = k can arise in equilibrium. When q

l > k  qh, we can argue, as in case (i), that
rm l has an incentive to deviate, as dl(
)ndql is strictly negative for all ql 2 (k; ql ];
while when ql  k < qh we can argue likewise for rm h. Taken together, we can thus
conclude that ql  qh cannot arise in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof that dqh=d
 < 0 follows directly from Corollary 1.
The proof for dql =d
 < 0 proceeds now analogously, making use of (23). As  ! , we
have from
ql   k = yl
R 

[F (ql =yl   )  F (ql =yl   )] dG()R 

f(ql =yl   )dG()
and by applying lHopitals rule that ql   k converges to
 ylG(
)
g()

=
= 0.
Next, from implicit di¤erentiation of (16), together with the stipulated strict quasicon-
cavity of the sellers program, the sign of the continuous function dql =d
 is determined
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by the expression
d2l
dqld
 = f(q

l =yl   )G()

(k   ql )
1
yl
g ()
G()
  1

: (30)
We know that ql < k for all 
 >  and that ql ! k as  ! , implying that dql =d
must be decreasing somewhere. Arguing to a contraction, suppose thus that dql =d
 > 0
were to hold for some values . Then, by continuity of dql =d
, there must be some
value(s)  >  where the term (30) is zero and where, in addition, it cuts zero from below.
To see that this can, however, not be the case, note that the derivative of (30) evaluated
at such a point  equals:
d (f(ql =yl   )G())
d

(k   ql )
1
yl
g ()
G()
  1

+f(ql =yl   )G()

 dq

l
d
1
yl
g ()
G()
+ (k   ql )
1
yl
d
d

g ()
G()

= f(ql =yl   )G()(k   ql )
1
yl
d
d

g ()
G()

< 0;
where the equality is due to the fact that at the considered value , both dql =d
 = 0
and
h
(k   ql ) 1yl
g()
G()   1
i
= 0. The inequality, in turn, follows from ql < k and from the
hazard rate assumption (23). This completes the contradiction. Q.E.D.
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